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AbstrAct 
The following article presents a series of hy-
potheses to analyze the possible transitions 
between protest and civil war and their relation 
to inequality. To do so, the article presents an 
analysis on the emergence of protests and its re-
lation with the increase in inequality across the 
world. This increase in inequality can in fact 
lead to social unrest, instability and in some 
cases facilitate the emergence of future armed 
conflicts. Thus this scenario of increased in-
equality presents different possible trajectories: 
1) protest generated by inequality can escalate 
into civil conflicts and civil war, or 2) protest 
generated by inequality can facilitate processes 
of participation and democratic consolidation. 
The possibility of either of these transitions 
taking place is defined by the structural condi-
tions that define the interactions between pro-
testors and authorities in particular settings. 
Key words: Inequality, horizontal inequality, 
Vertical inequality, protest, civil wars.
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resumen
A partir de una serie de hipótesis se estudian 
las posibles transiciones entre protestas y 
guerras civiles, y su relación con la existencia 
de inequidades en diferentes constituyentes. 
Se analiza la emergencia de una nueva ola 
de protestas, su relación con la existencia de 
inequidades y su aumento a nivel mundial. 
Este aumento puede, de hecho, favorecer la 
emergencia de conflictos sociales, inestabili-
dad política, y, en algunos casos, facilitar la 
emergencia de futuros conflictos armados. 
Este escenario de mayor inequidad presen-
ta posibles trayectorias, de manera que las 
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protestas podrían escalar hacia conflictos y 
guerras civiles; o pueden convertirse en parte 
de procesos de participación y consolidación 
democrática. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de 
estas transiciones está definida por una serie 
de condiciones estructurales que son endémi-
cas a cada país. 
Palabras clave: inequidad, inequidad ho-
rizontal, inequidad vertical, protestas, guerra 
civil.
IntroductIon
Is inequality related to the increase of protests? 
Is it likely that inequality will drive an increase 
in armed conflicts in the future? This article 
attempts to answer these questions, reflecting 
on the increase of inequality of incomes and 
the existence of protests and civil wars. 
The emergence of protests across the 
globe (since 2008) under different flags and 
agendas presents a phenomenon that requires 
further analysis. This is a symptom of social 
discontent, and could be interpreted as a 
symbol of dissatisfaction with the current po-
litical settlements in different countries. These 
tensions have been fuelled by the increase in 
inequality within countries (from the 1980’s) 
and the loss of responsiveness from states. How-
ever, the tensions created by inequality and the 
pressures/limits to state responsiveness are not 
new, protest was central to the emergence of the 
modern nation state and democracy1. Thus the 
increase in protests should not necessarily be 
seen as something we should be afraid of, but 
rather as an opportunity to consolidate partici-
pation within different states and constituents.
This research departs from the assump-
tion that protests and riots are a symptom of 
social discontent with existing social contracts 
(Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka 
& Tsounta, 2015), and that protests are there-
fore central to the process of negotiation and 
renegotiation of different social contracts. It is 
in this context that the ebb of the welfare state 
and the increase in inequality submits states 
and their institutions to tensions (Hobsbawn, 
2007, p. 4). Thus the emergence of a new wave 
of protests in response increase of inequalities 
can be seen as a symptom of future conflicts 
(Hobsbawn, 2007, p. 42). However these 
tensions are not expressed uniformly; protests 
should not be equated to violence or civil war, 
rather we should consider what elements seem 
to drive the transformation from unrest to 
violence and armed conflict. Protest is protest, 
civil war is civil war, and although they can be 
related in wider socio-historical processes, they 
are not the same. 
Thus the emergence of a new wave of 
protest that arise in contexts of high/increased 
inequality requires further analysis of the dif-
ferent possible scenarios that might emerge 
in response to such increased protest. The 
article argues that these protests present an 
unstable equilibrium, which may follow differ-
ent trajectories (protest can escalate into civil 
1 Although protests were informed by different inequalities, the demands that informed these protests related to 
the time and the space where they took place, so in the case of most European states these are related to the demands 
of proto-citizens of the emerging nations states in the middle ages. 
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conflicts and civil war, or protest can facilitate 
processes of participation and democratic 
consolidation).
The article presents a general overview 
of trends in inequality across the globe. The 
article proceeds to reflect on the impact of 
inequality on the emergence of protests and 
the possibility of the emergence of civil con-
flicts or civil wars according to findings in the 
literature. Finally, the article discusses differ-
ent hypotheses regarding the impact of rising 
inequalities on protests, and the possibility of 
future conflicts taking place. 
up or down?
 
Descriptions of trends in inequality are domi-
nated by claims supported by empirical evi-
dence; however these claims often speak of in-
equality without making explicit the nature of 
the inequality described (vertical or horizontal), 
or adequately specifying around what aspects 
of a society inequality is increasing or decreas-
ing (provision of public services, income, sav-
ings, education, etc.). As such, in many cases 
inequality functions as a category more than a 
proper descriptor. Thus if we aim to provide 
clear explanations around what is happening 
with inequality we need to elaborate around 
what is becoming more (or less) unequal, and 
how this inequality is being measured. 
Therefore, to assess if inequality is in-
creasing or decreasing I argue that we need 
to clarify four different things: what is being 
measured (income, outcome, etc.), the unit 
of analysis used (nation, individuals, regions, 
etc.), the measurement indicator used (Gini, 
Palma, etc.) and the time interval over which 
inequality is being measured.
Different sources claim that income in-
equality is increasing. Income inequality seems 
to have been increasing since the 1980’s. The 
debate on the importance of income inequali-
ties and its increase gained salience as an out-
come of the 2008 financial crisis (Cingano, 
2014, p. 8; Galbraith, 2012, p. 4). 
Although literature on global inequality 
(of incomes) and globalization have argued 
that incomes at national levels should con-
verge, meaning that inequality of incomes 
should stop diverging, the reality is that in-
equality of incomes has maintained the trend 
towards divergence (Milanovic, 2010, p. 104; 
Krugman & Venables, 1995). 
Inequality and poverty are related, but 
are not the same. Nevertheless, the picture 
that links income inequality and poverty at 
a worldwide level is more complex than ex-
pected. On the one hand extreme poverty has 
fallen globally by more than half from 52 per 
cent to 22 per cent between 1981 and 2008 
(World Bank, 2012, p. 1). At the same time, 
on average, income inequalities within coun-
tries seem to have increased (Milanovic, 2010, 
p. 153). This points to complex and intricate 
dynamics within countries. Citizens are on 
average better off than before, however, when 
it comes to income inequality, the differences 
between those within societies are widening. 
However, we should bear in mind that 
inequality is not necessarily bad per se. There 
is good and bad inequality, and the type of 
inequality is what matters. Inequality of op-
portunities speaks of inequality in access to 
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opportunities and in the capacity of individu-
als within a society to achieve their goals given 
this inequality. This bad form of inequality is 
widely understood to be unfair, and is evident 
in a society where the state does not respond 
equitably to its citizens such that the access to 
or provision of public services is unequal - this 
inequality entrenches cliques; access to re-
sources and real citizenry is afforded those who 
have more power or resources. Inequality of 
opportunity produces inequality of outcome; 
success in such societies is predestined by one’s 
position in society. 
By contrast, inequality of outcomes refers 
to the inequality in the achievement reached 
by individuals as a byproduct of their efforts 
and work; this inequality is the difference in 
achievement where citizens had access to the 
same opportunities. This good inequality is 
the driver of innovation, success and entre-
preneurship. 
Our understanding of inequality and its 
extent is limited by our access to information 
and quality data. As such, we would expect 
better quality data to inform our understand-
ing what is happening with regard to differ-
ent kinds of inequalities in more “developed” 
countries. In addition, we should bear in mind 
that the measurement of inequality is some-
thing fairly recent, with a history of less than 
a hundred years (Kuznets, 1955).
In general, most of the assertions made 
regarding inequality in the literature in recent 
years refer to international inequality (the 
inequalities between countries), in particular 
to international inequality of incomes (Pik-
etty, 2015; Stiglitz, 2012; Cingano, 2014; 
Galbraith, 2012). Most current accounts of 
inequality make comparisons between groups 
of countries for which data is available (North 
America and oecd countries). For example, in 
most oecd countries the gap between the rich 
and the poor is at its highest level in 30 years, 
as illustrated by the fact that the richest 10% 
of the population earn 9.5 times the income 
of the poorest 10% of the population in oecd 
countries (Cingano, 2014, p. 6). 
It is important to state that a general 
description of what is happening to global 
inequality might be inaccurate (Milanovic, 
2010). As the indicators on inequality tend to 
aggregate varied and diverse contexts (e.g. Sub-
Saharan Africa is compared with Northern 
Europe and India, etc.), any claim regarding 
what is happening to inequality at a global level 
is bound to rely on strong generalizations2. 
Thus, in order to make these assertions more 
precise, we need to consider what is happen-
ing with regard to within country inequalities 
and how this impacts comparisons. The world 
is a diverse space, and aggregate indicators 
may produce inaccurate information as they 
tend to mask, rather than reflect, this inher-
ent diversity. 
Aggregation may serve to produce ‘aver-
ages’ that mask difference over geographical 
areas, among population groups and over time. 
For example, the measurement of inequality 
2 In addition to this, since quality data is not necessarily available everywhere, some measurements rely on 
questionable data.
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of incomes (measured through the Gini index) 
for oecd countries shows different aggregate 
dynamics for three different time intervals in 
the same geographical space (see Figure one). 
From the mid 1980’s to mid-1990’s income 
inequality increased; from the mid-1990’s to 
late 2000’s there was a slight reduction of in-
come inequality, while when we compare the 
income inequality in the interval between the 
mid-1980’s to late 2000’s we find an increase 
in income inequality in oecd countries. 
figure 1
trends in income inequality. percentage point changes 
in the gini coefficient on income
Source:	oecd	(2011).	
 It is important to note that the majority of the 
findings discussed in recent work on inequality 
use data from the ‘western world’ and pertain 
to these areas. Piketty shows that after a long 
downward trend, income inequality in “west-
ern” nations has increased in the last 30 years 
(1980 - 2010). This has been a byproduct of 
the decrease of direct taxation on income and 
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inheritance (Milanovic, 2010, p. 10), and in-
tensified by technological change3 (Economists 
for peace & Security, 2016, p. 5).
The increase of income inequality, and 
the entrenchment of inequalities of opportu-
nities further fuelled by the control of capital 
and technology by small groups of people 
present an important scenario to analyze, 
given that these forces can further inequality 
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011; Milanovic, 
2010, p. 107).
Income inequality thus has been represen-
tative of this process, and played an important 
role in the 2008 crisis, and the possible crises 
to come. This concern has been further fuelled 
by the apparent ability of money to bypass the 
capacity of states to regulate them (Piketty, 
2015) due to its mobility.
While globalization is presented as the 
culprit of the rise of inequality4, we cannot 
overlook the fact that these changes in inequal-
ity are also ultimately the consequence of the 
national rules of the game agreed at a country 
level. Politics at a national level still matter 
(Stiglitz, 2012; Rodrik, 2012). 
Evidence of continued increases in in-
equality of incomes became evident in the 
1980’s when inequality began to increase in 
the advanced economies (Piketty, 2015, p. 20). 
This phenomenon of increases of inequality 
is further complicated by the fact that demo-
graphics have changed across the world across 
different countries5. The improvement in life 
expectancies brought about by the welfare 
state and improvements in health have affected 
intergenerational mobility as well (Lefranc, 
Pistolesi & Trannoy, 2008, p. 514). As life ex-
pectancy has extended, disposable income has 
increased, fuelling further inequality trends: 
now old and wealthy citizens have more time 
to continue enjoying their rents while the tax 
on their inheritances that would have created 
some redistribution effects once they perish 
takes longer be effected, and has in any case 
also been reduced by lower taxation6. This 
means that the difference in incomes, savings 
and the like are more likely to be stretched 
out than grouped in the future. The seed of 
future protests. 
3 Technological change has increased the return to skilled labour relative to unskilled labour, increasing income 
inequality
4 As capitalism at a global scale drives down wages, the role of multinational companies and hyper financialization 
is increased through financial liberalization and weak regulation; thus, there is the likelihood that income inequality 
is due to increase.
5 I have not described on this document the trends in income inequality in the ‘non-advanced’ world. Therefore for 
stating the hypotheses of the increase of income inequality and protests, I will resort to the evidence of oecd countries.
6  Surely there should be differences in regards to the impact and the extent of the changes in inequality (of incomes) 
in non-oecd countries; however given the absence of good quality data in some of these countries, it is hard to assess 
as part of a general assessment (one could undertake specific country analysis for this) how different are the mechanics 
of trends in inequality in these contexts.
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Inequality and protest
Research on the impact of inequality on pro-
tests has gained salience in recent years as a 
product of recent developments such as the 
occupy movements, and the financial crisis of 
2008 (Galbraith, 2012). However, protests are 
not new phenomena (Tarrow, 2011). In fact, 
it can be claimed that protests play a constitu-
tive role in the inception of the modern nation 
state (Tilly, 2006). What we will see is the 
possibility of protests related to the increase of 
inequality in different countries taking place. 
Thus, when a group of citizens protest in 
relation to inequality, they protest with regard 
to a particular subject, policy or action related 
to inequality - be it inequality in educational 
provision, access to public services, or the 
levels of unemployment in a particular coun-
try. Thus, the existence of protests related to 
inequality can be thus understood in relation 
to the existence of inequalities with regards to 
the expectations and delivery of public policies 
(real, or perceived). 
Governments’ responses to inequality 
cannot assume that full equality would lead 
to there being no protests at all. The notions 
of equality and inequality have multiple di-
mensions; the possibility that any system and 
any social contract could avoid unacceptable 
inequalities in all dimensions is a chimera 
(Sen, 1992). However, what can be argued 
is that policy options should aim to reduce 
inequalities of opportunities, so that the exist-
ing inequalities in countries are those related 
to outcomes and achievement. This would 
involve limiting the impact of particular in-
equalities that entrench inequalities with re-
gard to the provision of and access to public 
services and rights.
Understanding the impact of protests 
related to inequality and their link with state-
hood should allow us to consider how pro-
tests related to inequality have been related to 
processes of instability across the world. The 
revolutions in Russia, China and France were 
preceded by protests. The claims underpinning 
these protests were informed by the inequal-
ity between different constituents (Skocpol, 
1979). When South Africans protested during 
and after Apartheid, their protests have been 
informed by the unequal treatment given to 
citizens by their government. When Sinhalese 
and Tamils protested before the emergence of 
the civil war in Sri Lanka, they did so in re-
sponse to the unequal allocation of resources 
and benefits to citizens (Abeyratne, 2004). The 
protests and riots in Northern Ireland before 
the emergence of the civil war expressed a de-
mand to belong to a society of equals (White, 
1989, p. 36). 
The recent increase in protests across 
the world under different banners therefore 
requires attention (Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research, 2015; Dabla-
Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka & 
Tsounta, 2015). These protests could signal 
an era of instability and tension. The claims 
that inequality can breed instability (Stiglitz, 
2012, p. 27), and in other cases that instabil-
ity breeds inequality which bears instability 
(Cingano, 2014, p. 11), are valid and should 
be given attention.
The existence of extreme inequality has 
the potential to damage trust and social cohe-
sion and the belief in the social contract and 
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its institutions within a particular country and 
can lead to instability (Milanovic, 2010). It 
is in this context that income inequality, and 
the rise of other inequalities, has the poten-
tial to fuel the de-legitimization of the state 
structures, mobilizing opposition frustrated 
with the status quo (Cederman, Gleditsch & 
Wucherpfenning, 2014). 
When denunciations of the status quo 
are not responded to or acknowledged by the 
state, there is a higher likelihood that political 
instability will result (World Bank, 2012, p. 
2). History reminds us that citizens denied of 
adequate forms of participation will protest and 
even revolt (Fukuyama, 2011, p. 32). Inequal-
ity is thus deeply related to protests. However, 
the existence of inequalities does not lead to one 
single possible outcome (protest); civil conflict 
and civil war is another possible outcome. 
Inequality and civil war
The relationship between inequality and civil 
war is still contested; evidence can be found to 
support the link between inequality and con-
flict, and also to reject this relationship (Man-
cini, 2008, p. 2). Does this mean inequality 
does not matter for conflict? The absence of 
conclusive evidence does not necessarily mean 
we should disregard the findings and insights 
of academics who have found evidence sup-
porting both claims. If we are to understand 
how inequality affects or does not affect the 
emergence of conflict, we need to determine 
under which conditions inequality can be re-
lated to civil war and civil conflict. 
A preliminary illustration of the inconclu-
sive nature of the balance of evidence on the 
relationship between inequality and conflict 
can be illustrated in the figure above (Figure 
2). As we can see, several countries where in-
equality is salient (according to this particular 
index) - Brazil, The United States of America, 
and Chile - do not suffer/have not suffered 
from civil war in the last 70 years. However, 
other countries on the continent with similar 
levels of inequality have experienced or suffer 
from conflict within the same time period, 
for example Colombia, Nicaragua and Guate-
mala. As such, it seems that there is something 
more to conflict than just inequality per se. 
This lack of a clear and consistent causal 
link between inequality and civil war calls into 
question the claims of the literature which 
asserts that inequality does make civil war 
more likely (Houle, 2015, p. 2). This connec-
tion remains unclear (Buhaug, Cederman & 
Gleditsch, 2014, p. 418), as whether or not 
inequality translates into conflict depends on 
other factors, including the legitimacy of the 
state, its strength and the political conditions 
of a country (Cramer, 2003, p. 409). It might 
be the case that elements mediate between 
increases in inequality and the emergence of 
civil war: the strength of the social contract, the 
perception of citizens and the facility to mobi-
lize citizens against the state and the capacity 
of the state to embrace dissent.
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figure 2
Inequality in America in 2013 using the gInI index (on income) 
as a measure of inequality for each country7
Source:	World	Economic	Forum	(2015).	
7 The darker the color of a country, the more unequal the country is.
8 The inequalities between individuals belonging to different groups. For example, wealth inequality between black 
and white citizens of a country.
9 The inequality among individuals in a unit of analysis. For example wealth inequality in a country.
The debate about the role of inequality in rela-
tion to the existence of civil war and protests 
involves many competing claims (Buhaug, 
Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014; Dabla-Norris, 
Kochhar, Suphaphitat, Ricka & Tsounta, 
2015; Cramer, 2003; Tilly, 2003; Gurr, 2015). 
However, these are better understood through 
differentiating these claims by the type of in-
equality being analysed: horizontal8, or verti-
cal inequality9. It has been found that vertical 
inequality is not statistically related to the 
onset of civil wars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; 
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Fearon & Laitin, 2003), while horizontal 
inequality has been found statistically sig-
nificant in describing the emergence of armed 
conflicts (Murshed & Gates, 2005; Stewart, 
2008; Østby, 2008 Cederman, Weidmann & 
Gleditsch, 2011). However, it is accurate to 
state that prevalent vertical inequalities have 
the potential to destabilize the social contract, 
and this can be manifested in processes of 
contestation that could escalate into civil war 
(Murshed, 2009. 
The research on horizontal inequalities 
offers an avenue that is better able to under-
stand the nuances of inequalities and conflict, 
especially given its interest in assessing both 
how the differences between different con-
stituencies (groups) within a country inform 
and relate to the emergence of civil conflict 
and civil war (Langer, Stewart & Venugopal, 
2012, p. 1), and when political and socio eco-
nomic disparities (inequality of opportunities) 
increase the risk of civil war and civil conflict 
(and when they do not) (Buhaug, Cederman 
& Gleditsch, 2014, p. 10). 
Horizontal inequality facilitates mobiliza-
tion towards conflict. This argument emerges 
from the observation that poverty regularly 
fosters citizens’ participation in warfare. In-
equality reduces the cost of hiring recruits; 
this makes the possibility of mounting a re-
bellion or recruiting soldiers easier (Houle, 
2015, p. 9). In addition it has been found that 
in societies where cultural or ethnic markers 
are salient, identity plays an important role 
reducing the costs of mobilization (not to be 
confused with the false claim that ethnicity 
makes war more likely) (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004). Where groups are marginalized and 
suffer from inequality, the importance of 
boundaries between different entitlements is 
heightened, as compared to a society without 
ethnic markers. This magnifies the notion of 
relative deprivation and fosters the possibil-
ity of the emergence of conflict where deep 
horizontal inequalities are expressed (Buhaug, 
Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014, p. 421).
However, the existence of salient inequali-
ties does not imply the emergence of war. The 
emergence of civil war requires the sponsorship 
of an financier, or the presence of resources that 
could be looted; without this, the recruitment, 
financing and operation of an armed resistance 
are hampered. One could in fact expect that 
in the absence of financiers and of external 
funding, the emergence of civil war in highly 
unequal countries would be limited. In addi-
tion the strength of the armed forces must be 
taken into account; it is assumed that the big-
ger (or the stronger) the armed forces are, the 
less likely it is that a civil war might emerge. 
Finally, the role of institutions and the state’s 
institutional framework for embracing or de-
terring escalation towards violence is essential 
– this involves how grievances are dealt with or 
ignored by the state and its apparatus, and how 
dissent is engaged within a society. The state 
and its institutions play a role in these pro-
cesses, which contribute to the emergence of 
civil war (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 
2011, p. 478). Thus it is common to observe 
repression, apathy or mere incompetence as 
the main responses of states in which civil war 
emerged following armed protests. 
If we overlook the possible links be-
tween protests about inequality and civil war 
we might be ignoring a key element in what 
3 5
I n e q u a l i t y ,  S o c i a l  P r o t e s t s  a n d  C i v i l  W a r 
D o s s i e r  t e m á t I C o
o a S I S ,  N o  2 6  •  J u l i o - D i c i e m b r e  2 0 1 7  •  p p .  2 5 - 3 9
defines the emergence of a particular type of 
contestation in a given country. I argue that 
protests and civil war can be studied as related 
processes, as they belong to a continuum in the 
state and the wider processes of contestation 
taking place within it. 
Civil wars, civil conflicts and protests speak 
to (of) the state in different ways, and identify 
the state as a point of contention. Civil wars 
challenge the state in order to reform a social 
contract and acquire rights, political participa-
tion, resources, independence or secession. This 
relates to the state and its institutions, structures 
and organization. On the other hand, protests 
are actions undertaken by citizens of a particu-
lar territory who demand reforms, recognition, 
or inclusiveness from public institutions10, ap-
pealing to the arbitration or intervention of the 
state. Protest aim to achieve structural changes 
- secession, policy change, regime change or the 
overthrowing of the current regime may be the 
goal. Civil war and protest may aim for similar 
objectives (a deep reorganization of the state and 
the social contract), but seem to operate with 
different repertoires. 
Analyzing the common properties that 
protests and civil wars share (Shaheen, 2015, 
p. 6; Hegre, Nygård & Ræder, 2017; Dudouet, 
2013) should thus allow us to further under-
stand their interaction, possible relationship 
with each other, and their relationship to the 
study of inequalities (horizontal). 
InequAlItIes And 
the InstAbIlIty AheAd
It is important to reflect on how inequality 
may affect the capacity of the nation states to 
conduct its affairs; in particular it is important 
to discuss how the existence of inequality af-
fects the likelihood of protests and turmoil in 
the future.
The capacity of states to respond to cer-
tain inequalities (income) is limited, thus the 
capacity of the state to respond to the demands 
in regards to these inequalities will have to deal 
with structural issues that are beyond the full 
control of the state and will be limited. Thus 
states face a challenge regarding how to regain 
legitimacy in the face of their constituents, 
given the difficulties faced in implementing 
policies that transcend their borders and the 
flows of capital that are not bounded by na-
tionhood. 
Widespread dissemination of informa-
tion about different countries and lifestyles 
will create greater demands for equality of 
opportunities from the state will likely lead to 
an increase in protests related to the increase of 
inequalities (income inequalities) as disaffected 
citizens protest against their governments’ 
perceived failure to deliver the goods, services, 
protections and opportunities provided that 
were expected or assumed to be received as 
part of their social contract (Murshed, 2002).
10 Here I address protests that are directed towards government actors. Protests that challenge the behavior of private 
actors are not considered here, despite the fact that these protests might relate with the public sphere and the existing 
social contract in a particular state. 
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In countries where social mechanisms re-
produce and stabilize exploitation and inequal-
ity (Tilly, 2003a; Mosse, 2010, p. 1162) a de-
crease in confidence in the institutions and the 
state will likely lead to unrest (Stiglitz, 2012).
Given this I propose the following hy-
potheses around the possible impacts of in-
creasing inequalities for the emergence of 
protests and civil war:
Rising horizontal inequality that is paired 
with the failure of the state to fulfill its func-
tions can lead to protests and civil war (Mur-
shed, 2009, p. 139). Even in the cases where 
this loss of welfare due to state failure is ac-
knowledged by states, but where there are not 
enough resources to compensate citizens’ losses 
caused by rising inequalities (institutions can-
not implement the changes that improve the 
conditions of citizens sufficiently fast, or where 
legitimacy is frail), instability will prevail - cre-
ating a vicious circle of instability and weak-
ness in institutions. 
An increase in inequality in a context in 
which representation is limited or failing will 
lead to a decrease in legitimacy and an increase 
in perceived relative deprivation, risking the 
weakening of the regime and the emergence of 
civil war. This is particularly the case in weaker 
autocratic states where cliques have assumed 
control and the provision of public goods is 
limited (Tilly, 2003b, p. 37). 
In democratic regimes that that are inca-
pable of exerting collective controls over finan-
cial capital, information, media and scientific 
and technical knowledge (weak democracies), 
rising inequality will create tensions that might 
weaken state institutions, and in some cases 
lead to de-democratization and instability 
(Tilly, 2003b, p. 42). In these contexts when 
inequality increases we can expect protests to 
emerge in the short term.
In strong states with strong repressive 
apparatus, the presence of salient inequali-
ties or increasing inequalities will not likely 
to spur protests or conflict. This is because of 
the dissuasive effect of the state, the difficulty 
of mounting opposition against a strong op-
ponent, and the capacity of the state to instill 
effective propaganda campaigns that minimize 
the sense of relative deprivation (Ostby, 2007, 
p. 7). If an increase in inequality does not af-
fect the capacity of the state to enforce laws, 
property rights and contracts, their own social 
contract, and its capacity to raise revenues and 
provide public goods (McLoughlin, 2015, p. 
139), one may expect autocratic states to be 
impervious to inequality. 
In democratic societies there is the pos-
sibility that an increase in protests (as a result 
of increased inequalities) will strengthen the 
state. Where democratic governments offer 
protection and create systems of extraction and 
allocation of resources that respond to popular 
demands for redistribution to address increas-
ing inequalities, these might present collective 
benefits or the redistribution of resources in 
favor of those affected by various inequalities 
(Tilly, 2003b, p. 38), which can constitute a 
reassertion of their social contract. However, 
this is more likely to occur in strong states that 
are in the position to counter grievances due 
to having the resources to counterbalance the 
sense of deprivation (Bethke & Bussmann, 
2011, p. 2). 
Inequality is connected to the social con-
tract, and the nation state. The state will con-
3 7
I n e q u a l i t y ,  S o c i a l  P r o t e s t s  a n d  C i v i l  W a r 
D o s s i e r  t e m á t I C o
o a S I S ,  N o  2 6  •  J u l i o - D i c i e m b r e  2 0 1 7  •  p p .  2 5 - 3 9
tinue to exist as a space in which inequalities 
are contested and where future tensions will 
put the capacity of the state to embrace dissent 
to the test. However the growing gap between 
the political and economic systems and the 
inequalities this separation creates will set the 
stage for the new challenges to be faced by na-
tion states (Stiglitz, 2012, p. XXXVIII). These 
challenges and tensions will be heightened by 
the pressures of a globalized world on gov-
ernments, citizens and their social compacts. 
These might in fact mark the beginning of a 
new era of global turmoil. 
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